I. INTRODUCTION
1 HE positive beliefs of economists systematically differ from those of the general public,~ but the public is itself heterogeneous. What factors tend to make noneconomists "think like economists," that is, to moderate or eliminate their rejection of economists' consensus positions? Using data from the "Sur-397 ECONOMIC COGNITION and analyzes the results. Section IV proposes and conducts a more formal test of these generalizations. Section V discusses the variation of beliefs in the economist subsample. Section VI concludes.
II. THE DATA
Estimation throughout this paper uses the "Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy" data set.7 The structure of this data set is unique: while there are a number of other surveys on the economic beliefs of the public8 and economists,9 to my knowledge this is the only one to deliberately ask both groups the same questions.1?
The respondents were 1,510 members of the public and 250 economists with Ph.D.s; both groups were interviewed by telephone. The respondents from the general public were selected nationwide using standard randomdialing techniques. Economists were randomly selected members of the American Economic Association who held a Ph.D. in economics, were employed full-time as an economist, and specialized in domestic economic policy.11 Blendon and coauthors12 summarize the study's basic findings. Table 1 lists the SAEE's quite rich set of independent variables and compares the means and standard deviations of the general public and economists.13 It includes several narrowly economic variables: income, job security, recent income growth, and expected income growth. Each of these measures Tables  Table 1 and Table 2 is discrete: the income measure goes from 1 to 9, the job security measure from 0 to 3, and the growth measures from 0 to 2. The SAEE has the standard demographic variables: gender, age, and race. There are dummy variables for Asian, black, and "other race" (predominantly Hispanics), with white as the reference category. Other independent variables include measures of education (from 1 to 7), partisan affiliation dummies (Democrat, Republican, and "other party," with independent as the reference category), and selfdescribed ideology, from -2 ("very liberal") to +2 ("very conservative").'4 Finally, there is a dummy variable, Econ, to distinguish economists from noneconomists.
14 Respondents were also allowed to deny that they think in liberal-conservative terms. If so, the dummy variable Othideol takes on a value of 1. Estimating the effect of ideology therefore requires two variables: Ideology x (1 -Othideol), which picks up the effect of ideology for those who think in liberal-conservative terms, and Othideol, which picks up the beliefs of those who do not.
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Comparing the means for the general public in Table 1 Table 2 lists the current paper's dependent variables and compares the mean responses and standard deviations for economists and the general public. Thirty-four of the questions about economic beliefs in the SAEE permit three answers (coded as 0, 1, or 2) that can be straightforwardly placed along a single dimension. One question permits five responses (coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) that can be similarly ranked. The two remaining questions have two possible responses (coded as 0 or 1). The questions in Table 2 span diverse subjects, coveting everything from the economic harm attributable to high taxes and the deficit, to the effects of increased female labor force participation, to predictions about the living standard of the next generation.18 These questions can be classified into three main groups. The first block, numbered 1-18, asks respondents to state whether different factors-such as high taxes or the deficit-are "major reasons," "minor reasons," or "not a reason at all" why "the economy is not doing better than it is." The next group, questions 19-25, asks whether a potentially relevant force is "good for the economy," "bad for the economy," or "doesn't make much difference." The miscellaneous third category is composed of the 12 remaining questions that vary widely in format.
III. WHAT MAKES PEOPLE THINK LIKE ECONOMISTS: BASIC RESULTS

A. Overview
Thirty-seven ordered logits, one for each of the dependent variables listed in Table 2 , were estimated using the pooled data for the general public and economists from the SAEE. All equations used a common set of independent variables: race dummies, age, age squared, gender, job security, recent income growth, expected income growth, income, party, ideology, and education. Tables 3-5 Examine, for example, the "Econ Sign" column of Table 3 's TAXHIGH row. It shows that the impact of Econ on TAXHIGH is negative and significant; controlling for all other factors, economists are less likely to believe that high taxes are a major economic problem. The next column, "Education Sign," shows that the impact of Education on TAXHIGH is negative and significant; controlling for everything else, the more educated are less likely to believe that high taxes are a major economic problem. The column to its immediate right, labeled "Education & Econ," uses a check mark to show that both variables are significant and have the same sign. In contrast, Table  4 shows that the impact of Ideology on TAXHIGH is positive; the more conservative respondents are, the more harm they see in high taxation.19 The "Ideology & Econ" column of the TAXHIGH row thus has an X instead of a check mark, indicating that while both Econ and Ideology exert a statistically significant influence, they have opposite signs.
Note that even when Econ and, for example, Education have the same sign on a given question, more education does not necessarily make individuals' responses on that question more closely resemble economists'. 
B. What Makes People Think Like Economists
Five independent variables have a strong and consistent tendency to make people think like economists: Education, Male, Yourlast5, Youmext5, and Jobsecurity (Table 3) . Out of the 37 dependent variables, the coefficient on Econ is statistically significant 31 times. Within this subset of 31 equations, Education exerts a statistically significant influence 21 times, compared to 17 for Male, 14 for Yourlast5, 12 for Yournext5, and 16 for Jobsecurity. In almost every case, the following patterns hold: Education makes people think more like economists (two exceptions). Males think more like economists (same two exceptions). Recent and expected income growth make people think more like economists (no exceptions). Greater job security makes people think more like economists (no exceptions). Changing any of these variables while holding all others fixed at their sample means never results in overshooting.
Consider for instance the probability that a respondent believes that "taxes are too high" is a "major reason" why the economy is not doing better than it otherwise would.20 As Table 3 shows, the signs on Econ, Education, Male, Yourlast5, and Jobsecurity are all negative and significant. Holding all variables other than Econ at the sample means, a predicted 61.9 percent of the general public-but only 40.3 percent of economists-affirms that high taxes are a major problem. Raising a noneconomist's education level from its mean to its maximum (7, postgraduate) reduces the fraction of "major" responses to 44.3 percent. Changing the hypothetical respondent's gender to female raises it to 65.4 percent. Raising subjects' recent income growth to its highest possible value brings it down to 53.5 percent; doing the same for job security lowers it to 58.0 percent.
To take another example, economists and the general public sharply disagree about the applicability of supply-and-demand analysis to the 1996 20 The variable identifier is TAXHIGH. 
C. What Does Not Make People Think Like Economists
Two classes of variables conspicuously fail to make people think like economists (Table 4) . Even though recent and expected income growth make people think more like economists, the level of income does not. Income plays a statistically significant role in only four equations. In three of the four cases, more income makes people think less like economists, not more. In spite of the popular view that economists rationalize the interests of the affluent,24 if anything, there is a slight tendency for economists and the affluent to disagree. The mistake is understandable, however, given the high correlation between income and education (r = .55) and the strong tendency for economists and the better educated to agree. This is a classic omittedvariable problem. Moving to individual questions, there are definitely instances where economists embrace extremely conservative beliefs. But there are about equally many cases where economists profess extremely liberal beliefs. Suppose one compares ideologically moderate, politically independent economists to two archetypes: "right-wing ideologues" (very conservative Republicans) and
A second popular perception25 is that economists are essentially conservative ideologues. It is therefore noteworthy that economists are about as likely to agree with liberals as with conservatives, and with Democrats as with Republicans. Measuring ideology from -2 (very liberal) to +2 (very
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There are a number of questions where, on average, economists are more extreme than right-wing ideologues. They are even less worried about high profits, executive pay, and downsizing and are more likely to see both downsizing and current economic disturbances as good on the whole. Economists are also much more likely to accept a supply-and-demand explanation for the gas price rise and have more optimistic views of the quality of new jobs and the growth of real incomes and wages over the past 20 years.28 There are other equations where economists are more extreme than left-wing ideologues: they worry even less about foreign aid, immigration, welfare, affirmative action, and the work ethic.29 Economists also have left-leaning perspectives on high taxes, tax cuts, and female labor force participation and right-leaning perspectives on tax breaks, business investment in the workforce, and families' need for two incomes.30 But there is overshooting in these latter cases: the noneconomist ideologues take more extreme positions than the nonideological economists.
By choosing a biased subset of questions, it would naturally be possible to "show" that a nonideological economics profession is actually highly politicized, or vice versa.31 It is important to realize, then, that the authors of the SAEE did not deliberately pick questions to yield this result. They did not aim to construct a survey with even numbers of liberal and conservative questions that economists were already known to support. As the SAEE authors explain, they were interested in studying three dimensions of economic beliefs and picked questions accordingly: "assessments of current and past economic performance; expectations for the economic future; and perceptions of why the economy is not doing better."32 In other words, the motivation behind the SAEE's construction was largely orthogonal to traditional political ideologies. Still, the possibility of ideological question bias is worth addressing in further research, perhaps by selecting a random sample of topics from newspapers or economic journals to constrain the survey designers' discretion.
D. Other Factors
The list of independent variables also includes race dummies, Age, and Age2. The race dummies are relatively unimportant: there are nine equations where Econ and Black are both significant, compared to three for Asian and four for "other races. There is a clearer pattern for Age and Age2: the linear effect of Age is to magnify disagreement with economists, but its quadratic effect is to diminish them. Econ and Age are both significant in 10 equations; they have opposite signs in nine of them. Econ and Age2 are both significant in 11 equations; they have the same sign in 10. In sum, both the young and the old are a little more likely to think like economists than the middle-aged. The precise age of predicted maximal disagreement varies from question to question but usually occurs sometime between the late 30s and early 50s.
E. Beliefs and the Business Cycle
The SAEE was collected during July, August, and September of 1996. Is it possible that the time the survey was administered skewed the responses? As an anonymous referee points out, one serious possibility is that noneconomists' attitudes are fixed (always favoring tax cuts or deficit reduction, for example), while economists' beliefs are sensitive to cyclical variables.
Fortunately, the SAEE was conducted during a quite "normal" period for the macroeconomy. The inflation rate for 1996 was 3 percent, and the unemployment rate ranged from a high of 5.7 percent to a low 5.4 percent. Thus, although part of the reason for economists' disagreements with the public may be the former's greater attention to current conditions, 1996 was a year in which one would expect disagreement to be close to its "normal" level. In other words, suppose the belief gap were decomposed into a "permanent" and a "cyclical" component. Then during 1996, the magnitude of the cyclical component must have been small. Seeing whether such a cyclical component of the belief gap exists-and, if so, how it behaves over the business cycle-must be left for future research.33 But it would be difficult to interpret the SAEE's differences as a purely cyclical effect. Tables 3-5 20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37   Varia   TAXHIG  DEFICIT  FORAID  IMMIG  TAXBRE  INADED  WELFAI  AA  HARDW  REG  SAVING  PROFHI(  EXECPA  BUSPRC  TECH  OVERSE  DOWNS]  COMPEI  TAXCU1  WOMEN  TECHGC  TRADE}  DOWNG  CHANG]  TRADEJ  WHYGA  PRES  GASPRI(  NEWJOE  GAP20  INCOME  WAGE2(  NEED2E  STAN5  CHILDG  CHILDS'  CURECC   TABLE 6 VALUES OF e AND W COEFFICIENTS B. w COEFFICIENTS school (Education = 1) to a postgraduate (Education = 7) level is thus roughly equivalent to 55.8 percent (9.3 percent x 6) of an advanced economics degree. Males think about 15.7 percentage points more like economists than females-an effect comparable to about one-and-a-half educational steps. Each discrete one-unit increase in recent income growth, expected income growth, and job security is, respectively, 12.2, 9.9, and 5.9 percent as potent as an economics Ph.D. The interpretation of the w coefficients is similarly intuitive: the larger the absolute value of a w coefficient, the more "economistic" a topic is (Table  6 , panel B) . In each equation, the w coefficient serves a double role. Multiplying through, it can be seen that it is simply the coefficient on the Econ dummy. It captures the average effect of economic training. At the same time, the w coefficients also measure the question-specific importance of the other five economistic variables. For example, w(l), the coefficient in front of the brackets for the TAXHIGH equation, is equal to -.514. Ceteris paribus, the predicted belief for an economist is consequently .514 less than that for a noneconomist. But the value of the w coefficient has further implications: the predicted effect on TAXHIGH is -.048 (-.514 x .093) for a unit of education, -.081 (-.514 x .157) for male gender, and so on.
IV. WHAT MAKES PEOPLE THINK LIKE ECONOMISTS: A FORMAL TEST
A. Basic Results
Examining the results for
After imposing such strong colinearity restrictions, the w coefficients are nevertheless statistically significant in 34 out of the 37 equations at the 5 percent level. For most questions, the effect of economistic variables is large in both statistical and economic terms. Economistic variables exert the most influence for the questions about foreign aid, high profits, overseas competition, immigration, technological unemployment, the price of gas, downsizing, and executive compensation. The absolute t-statistics of the w coefficients for these questions exceed 20.36 Economistic variables exert only moderately less influence on 16 further variables, where the w coefficients have absolute t-statistics smaller than 20 but greater than 10. There are only three questions where the estimated values of w are small enough to suggest that economistic variables play no role.
B. Sensitivity Tests
Other Economistic Variables? To see whether any important variables were being left out of the bracketed expression, the preceding system was reestimated after adding income and ideology to the package of economistic variables. Equation ( Altering the specification in this way had almost no effect on the final results. Both e(6) and e(7) were statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the other e coefficients barely changed. This might be expected for income, which played little role in Section III's unrestricted estimation. Ideology' s influence, in contrast, was large when coefficients were unrestricted. But forcing Ideology to be colinear with the Econ dummy and the other economistic variables completely masks its effect.37
Exploring the Role of Education. All of the earlier specifications force educational steps to have equal effects. Adding a college graduate dummy to the system (1)-(37) to test this restriction shows that it is an oversimplification.38 The coefficient on the original education measure remains positive and highly significant. But the college graduate dummy exerts a strong independent effect. One step of education matters 4.5 percent-and college graduation 20.1 percent-as much as an economics Ph.D. The remaining e and w coefficients hardly change at all. Adding a college graduate effect thus suggests a mildly larger belief gap between economists and college graduates and a markedly larger belief gap between economists and the rest of the public.
There is a related concern. Economists in the SAEE always have the highest level of education. Perhaps economists think like the highly educated rather than the highly educated think like economists;39 in other words, their distinctive beliefs might stem from their maximal education rank rather than their economic training. To test for this possibility, the preceding system was reestimated after limiting the sample to respondents with Education = 7 (and dropping Education from the independent variables). It turns out that even within this subsample, economists remain as distinctive as ever; t-statistics naturally shrink because of the smaller sample size, but on average the magnitude of the w coefficients is about the same. The estimated effect of male gender actually rises to 20.6 percent of economic training; the other e 37 Searching for other variables improperly omitted from the list of economistic variables uncovers little evidence that any exist. Age and Age2 are the only ones with a case, and it is quite marginal: if appended to the set of independent variables inside the brackets, their coefficients' respective t-statistics are - There are systematic belief differences between economists and the public, but economists disagree with each other as well. Why? Do the same variables that matter for the general public matter for economists too? Conversely, do variables-especially income-that matter little for the public play a larger role within the economic subculture? Using only the data for economists, this section reruns the ordered logits from Section III to see if any patterns emerge. After dropping Education and Econ from the right-hand side, the remaining independent variables are race, age, age squared, gender, job security, recent and expected income growth, income, party identification, and ideology. Table 7 summarizes the results for both variables that make the general public think like economists (gender, income growth, and job security) and variables that do not make the general public think like economists (income, ideology, and party identification), recording the signs of those variables significant at the 5 percent level. Looking for example at Table 7 's TAXHIGH row, it can be seen that liberal Democratic economists are significantly less worried than conservative Republican economists about high taxes. Gender, income growth, job security, and income, in contrast, make no apparent difference for economists' beliefs on this question.
Overall, the SAEE evidence suggests that disagreements among economists are surprisingly random. There are 10 questions for which nothing in Table 7 matters. Income remains a poor predictor of economists' beliefs. At most, those with higher income are slightly more prone to think that supply and demand explain the gas price rise, that trade agreements cost jobs, and that real wages and incomes rose over the last 20 years.41 Most of the strongest patterns in the public's beliefs fade in the economist-only subsample: gender, recent income growth, and job security rarely matter for economists.42 Expected income growth is the only "economistic" variable that matters for 40 Reestimating the system (1')-(37') for respondents with Education = 7 shows that within this subsample, both income and conservatism make people think more like economists. Each discrete income step makes respondents think 3.5 percent more like economists; each discrete ideological step makes respondents think 6.4 percent more like economists. (The other economistic coefficients stay about the same: expected income growth matters more, while job security and recent income growth matter less.) Perhaps this explains the stereotype that links economistic thinking with affluence and conservatism: while false for the overall population, it is somewhat true at the highest education levels. 41 The variable identifiers are WHYGASSD, TRADEJOB, WAGE20, and INCOME20.
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Note, however, that the small percentage of female economists (5 percent) would make gender gaps difficult to statistically detect if they were present. 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37   DEFICIT  FORAID  IMMIG  TAXBREAK  INADEDUC  WELFARE  AA  HARDWORK  REG  SAVINGS  PROFHIGH  EXECPAY  BUSPROD  TECH  OVERSEAS  DOWNSIZE  COMPEDUC  TAXCUT  WOMENWORK  TECHGOOD  TRADEAG  DOWNGOOD  CHANGE20  TRADEJOB  WHYGASSD  PRES  GASPRICE  NEWJOB  GAP20  INCOME20  WAGE20  NEED2EARN  STAN5  CHILDGEN  CHILDSTAN economists themselves. Those who expect their own income to rise are more pessimistic about business productivity growth and the president's ability to affect the economy and more optimistic about immigration, the work ethic, and the future of the economy.43 The leading correlates of economists' disagreement are political-ideology and, to a lesser extent, party affiliation. Liberal Democratic and conservative Republican economists disagree in expected ways about taxes, regulation, excessive profits and executive pay, and some employment-related issues. Conservative economists are also markedly more optimistic about the country's economic future.44 Note, however, that there is little evidence of an ideological divide over the economy's past or present performance. Economists across the political spectrum can largely agree about the path of inequality, real income, and real wages over the past two decades.45
Compared to the results for the whole sample, the statistical significance of the ideology coefficients falls (unsurprising given the reduced number of observations), but their absolute magnitude tends to rise. As John Zaller46 documents, this is a common pattern: highly educated respondents match ideological stereotypes much more closely than less-educated respondents who use the same ideological label.47 Needless to say, the connection between economists' beliefs and their ideology could easily reflect reverse causation. Economists might choose ideologies because they fit well with their understanding of how the economy works.48
B. Belief Dispersion: How Economists and the Public Compare
How does economists' level of belief dispersion compare with the public' s? Are economists more able to agree than the public, or vice versa?49 One possibility is that the public continues to debate matters that professional economists see as settled. Another is that the public largely has its mind made up even though many economists doubt that the conventional wisdom is correct.
It turns out that the former hypothesis is closer to the truth: the beliefs of economists are moderately less dispersed than the public's. There is a segment of the population that finds the economic way of thinking relatively congenial. It is not the wealthy, however, nor is it conservative ideologues. Rather, the empirical core of this paper shows that people tend to agree with economists (1) if they are well educated, (2) if they are male, (3) if they recently experienced income growth, (4) if they expect income growth, or (5) if they have a high degree of job security. These findings are remarkably strong and consistent across a wide variety of beliefs. Section IV's formal analysis underscores the robustness of these findings. The e coefficients-positive and highly significant without exception-reflect the fact that all economistic variables tend to work in the same direction. The w coefficients-also highly significant as a group-reflect the fact that the set of economistic variables exerts a powerful influence on economic beliefs.
In the political science literature, there are close parallels to my results for education, gender, and income. On tests of objective political knowledge, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter52 show that education and male gender predict markedly higher scores, while income makes little difference. Scoring the number of "correct" answers to the SAEE's questions is admittedly less clear-cut. But it may be more than a coincidence that people with demonstrably greater political knowledge are also much less likely to strongly dissent from the beliefs typical of professional economists.
In contrast, to the best of my knowledge, nothing similar to my findings for income growth and job security have been reported by previous researchers. Perhaps this is only because few data sets of political and economic beliefs contain these variables. But there may be something unusual about economic beliefs that makes income growth and job security relevant. solving this question will have to be left for future research; the main challenge is to explain why income growth and job security matter, even though income level does not.
Incorporating this paper's empirical results into political economy models seems like an especially promising direction for further research. My findings suggest, for example, that the quality of economic policy is increasing in both the level of education and rate of economic growth. Thus, both growth and stagnation can be self-reinforcing.53 Similarly, changes in the franchise that reduce the median level of economic literacy should be expected to have a negative impact on the quality of economic policy. At the most general level, if economists' mean beliefs about how the economy works are correct, then analyzing the voting public through a rational expectations lens54 probably yields a distorted account of how democracies work. Verifying these conjectures must be left for future research. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
